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Grissom v. Johnson: Just The Facts...
I. INTRODUCTION
In Grissom v.Johnson (In re Grissom),' the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals established a case-by-case analytical model to determine when a
foreclosure sale brought a "reasonably equivalent value" under 11 U.S.C.
§ 548.2 Absent fraud, collusion, or illegal or unlawful procedures, courts
should presume that the price brought at the legitimate foreclosure sale is
a reasonably equivalent value of the property.3 For a bankruptcy trustee
"to avoid [a] foreclosure sale as [a] transfer of property for which [the]
debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value,"' the trustee "must
establish specific factors which undermine confidence in the reasonableness of the foreclosure sale price."5 The court held that in order to determine reasonable equivalency under 11 U.S.C. § 548, the court must consider and analyze all of the circumstances and factors surrounding a
foreclosure sale.6 The seventy percent test set forth by Durrett v.Washington National Insurance Co. 7 should only be used as a guideline or one
factor in a court's analysis.8 As this casenote will discuss, courts experi1.
2.

955 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1442. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988). Section 548 provides in pertinent part that:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor . . .(2)(A) received
less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation;
and (B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or
a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or (iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would
incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts
matured.
Id. § 548(a)(2)(A) &.(B) (i), (ii), (iii).
3. 955 F.2d at 1442.
4. Id. at 1441.
5. Id. at 1446.
6. Id. at 1449.
7. 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
8. 955 F.2d at 1445 (citing Walker v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 888 F.2d 90, 93 (11th
Cir. 1989)). See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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ence difficulty in interpreting the words "reasonably equivalent value"
given the lack of both a statutory definition and prior legal precedent.9
II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Grissom borrowed $18,000 from Citizens & Southern National Bank
("C & S") and secured the loan with the Grissoms' residence. The Grissoms defaulted on the note. C & S notified the Grissoms of the default
and of its intent to foreclose. After this notification, C & S advertised the
foreclosure sale. Thereafter, C & S performed a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale of the collateral. C & S complied with Georgia law and the parties'
agreement in its foreclosure method. The Johnsons, the highest bidders
at the sale, bought the property. The sale price of $14,059 was the exact
amount owed on the note to C & S by the Grissoms.'
One day after the foreclosure sale, the Grissoms filed for Chapter 13
bankruptcy protection. Then the Grissoms filed an adversary proceeding
against C & S and the Johnsons in the bankruptcy court.1 In their complaint, the Grissoms claimed that their bankruptcy estate could avoid the
foreclosure sale since they received less than the property's reasonably
equivalent value from the sale."
III.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

At trial in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia, the parties agreed that the foreclosure sale took place
within one year before the date that the Grissoms filed the bankruptcy
petition and left the Grissoms insolvent.13 The only issue for the trial
court to decide was whether the price brought at the foreclosure sale was
a reasonably equivalent value of the Grissoms' property.1 4 The bankruptcy court found that the property's market value was $26,000."6 The
bankruptcy court, relying on the seventy. percent test set forth in Durrett," ruled that C & S's foreclosure sale was avoidable because the price
at the foreclosure sale was not for the reasonably equivalent value of the
home. " On appeal, the United States District Court for the Southern
9.
10.
11.

955 F.2d at 1446.
Id. at 1443.
"The Johnsons are not a party to th[e] appeal." Id. at 1443 n.2.

12. Id. at 1443.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1444.
16. 621 F.2d at 203. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
17. 955 F.2d at 1444.
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District of Georgia also relied on Durrett and affirmed the bankruptcy
court's order. 1'8
IV.

POSTURE ON APPEAL: THE COURT'S OPINION

The bankruptcy court relied primarily on Durrett in determining the
reasonably equivalent value of the Grissoms' home.1 In Durrett the Fifth
Circuit determined under what circumstances the price brought at a foreclosure sale would be a "fair equivalent" within the meaning of Section
67(d)(1), (e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of 11 U.S.C.
§ 548.20 A foreclosure sale price of 57.7% of the fair market value of the
property is not a "fair equivalent" for the transfer of the property.2 The
court in Durrett stated:
We have been unable to locate a decision of any district or appellate
court dealing only with a transfer of real property as the subject of attack under section 67(d) of the [Bankruptcy] Act, which has approved a
transfer for less than 70 percent of the market value of the property.22
"[Tlhe 'Durrett 70% rule' became entrenched in many courts, despite the
2' 3
fact that [it] . . . was the purest form of dictum.
Prior to its ruling yet in Grissom after the trial in the bankruptcy
court, the court decided Walker v. Littleton (In re Littleton).24 In Littleton the court held that "a determination of reasonable equivalence
must be based upon all the facts and circumstances of each case."' 5 In
that case a nonjudicial foreclosure sale brought a price that was 63.49%
of the fair market value of the property.2 Since junior liens existed on
the property, the foreclosure sale deprived the bankruptcy estate of little
equity in the property.2 Despite the fact that it was not in compliance
with the Durrett seventy percent rule, the court of appeals did not avoid
the foreclosure sale of the Grissoms' residence.28 Under the facts of Littleton, the foreclosure sale brought a reasonably equivalent value of the
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1445.
Id. at 1444.

Id.
621 F.2d at 203.
Id.

23. 955 F.2d at 1444. See, e.g., Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler),
34 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 33 B.R. 642, 649-50
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
24. 955 F.2d at 1444.
25. 888 F.2d at 93.
26. Id. at 92.
27. Id. at 93.
28. 955 F.2d at 1445-46.
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property because, in addition to receiving 63.49% of the fair market value
of the property in cash, the debtor was relieved from the junior liens2 9
Courts have looked at factors other than the satisfaction of junior liens
when examining all the facts and circumstances of the case and determining reasonably equivalent value.30 Courts may look at the marketability of
the property.3 1 In Fargo Biltmore Motor Hotel Corp. v. Metropolitan
FederalBank (In re Fargo Biltmore Motor Hotel Corp.)," Metropolitan
Federal Bank foreclosed on the debtor's motel.3 3 At a sheriff's sale, Metropolitan Federal Bank purchased the property at a price that was seventy percent of the fair market value of the property.3' The debtor's
motel suffered from many physical problems.3 5 The motel was the oldest
motel facility in the area. The motel had a poor reputation and an average occupancy rate of only sixty percent. The facilities were also in need
of substantial capital improvement.3 6 The court in Fargo held that in
light of all "the facts and circumstances of this case . . . the payment by
Metropolitan of seventy percent of the property's value was a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer of Biltmore's interest in the
37
property.
38
In Gillman v. PrestonFamily Investment Co. (In re Richardson),
the
court held that the determination of reasonable equivalency depends on
the facts of a case. 3 9 The'court in Gillman stated that "[in all cases, facts
such as 'the bargaining position of the parties . . .' will be relevant.' 4
Courts should also consider that, generally, sales in foreclosure markets
bring less than sales in retail markets."1
Another important factor courts should use in determining whether the
debtor received reasonably equivalent value is the fact "that the property
was sold in the context of a lawful foreclosure proceeding.' 4 A legitimate
foreclosure sale, which is free from fraud, collusion, or irregular or unlawful procedures, results in a price that the court presumes to be a reasona29. Id. at 1446.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 49 B.R. 782 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1985).
33. Id. at 784.
34. Id. at 784, 789.
35. Id. at 790.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 23 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
39. Id. at 448.
40. Id. (citing Michael L. Cook, "Fraudulent Transfer Liability Under the Bankruptcy
Code," 17 Hous. L. REV. 263, 278 (1980)).
41. 888 F.2d at 93 (citing Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp., 55 B.R. 111 (E.D. N.Y. 1985)).
42. 955 F.2d at 1446 (citing Walker v. Littleton, 888 F.2d 90-93) (11th Cir. 1989)).
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bly equivalent value.' 3 To avoid a foreclosure sale under 11 U.S.C. § 548,
the bankruptcy trustee must show factors that "undermine confidence in
the reasonableness of the foreclosure sale price."" A showing that the
foreclosure sale price was less than seventy percent of the market value of
the property rebuts the reasonably equivalent value presumption. 5
Several other factors exist that are relevant to a reasonable equivalency
determination. "The bankruptcy court. . . must consider such factors as
whether there was a fair appraisal of the property, whether the property
was advertised widely, and whether competitive bidding was
encouraged.""'
At the beginning of Grissom's trial, the bankruptcy court informed the
parties that the court would decide the case on the authority of Durrett.'
The evidence that the parties presented at trial therefore focused on the
market value of the property.'" The clarification of 11 U.S.C. § 548 was
not available to the parties at trial because the court decided Littleton
two months after the trial in the bankruptcy court." The bankruptcy
court easily applied Durrett's seventy percent rule and.found the foreclosure sale price inadequate under that rule.50 Because of the lack of evidence regarding' matters other than market value, the bankruptcy court
could find "'no basis for. . . determin[ing] that the foreclosure sale now
before the court brought the debtor the reasonably equivalent value of
the property' "1 as it attempted to observe other factors of the sale as
Littleton requires. 2
The bankruptcy court incorrectly stated the burden of proof.53 Courts
should presume that lawful foreclosure sales bring a reasonably
equivalent value of the debtor's property, and the trustee must then
prove facts that rebut that presumption." The bankruptcy court should
have held that it could find no basis that the foreclosure sale did not
bring the reasonably equivalent value of the property. 5
The only findings in the record regarding the circumstances of the foreclosure sale were the following: C & S complied with Georgia foreclosure

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
955 F.2d at 1447.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1448.
Id. (quoting Order and Judgment of the Bankruptcy Court at 9, Exhibits Vol. 1).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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law; the foreclosure sale was advertised four times; and a comment by
Birnet Johnson that "'there were many bidders [at the foreclosure
salel.'"" The court of appeals could not determine whether the foreclosure sale price was a reasonably equivalent value under that record. 7
Since courts should presume that lawful foreclosure sales bring reasonably equivalent values unless the trustee proves circumstances indicating
otherwise, the Grissoms should lose under these circumstances5,8 A mere
violation of the Durrett seventy percent rule will not make a foreclosure
sale voidable under 11 U.S.C. § 548.59 Since the bankruptcy court made
clear to the parties before the trial that it would follow the Durrett seventy percent test, the court of appeals felt that justice would be better
served by vacating the orders of the bankruptcy and district courts and
remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings.60
V.

ANALYSIS

Under Durrett's seventy percent rule, trial courts could easily find reasonable equivalency.6 1 Courts should no longer mistake it as "the law of
[the eleventh] circuit."6 2 If Congress had intended courts to use a fixed
percentage to determine reasonable equivalency, it would have so
provided."
The purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 548 is to "ensur[e] that a foreclosing party
takes all commercially reasonable steps to recover not only its own interest in the property sold, but also the debtor's equity."'6' Two competing
policy concerns underlie this area of the law. 6 Secured creditors should

be able to foreclose without insuring losses resulting when foreclosure
property sells too cheaply.6 If courts, however, allow secured creditors to
ignore equity in foreclosures, the secured creditor's actions may undermine the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 548 of ensuring against unnecessary depletion of the bankruptcy estate.6
56. Id. (quoting Transcript at Trial at 54).
57.

Id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1449.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

63. 888 F.2d at 93.,
64.

955 F.2d at 1446.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1446-47.
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A totality of the circumstances best balances these competing policy
concerns.88 When a court avoids a foreclosure sale "because the market
. . .could not bring 70% of the property's value," s although it may promote bankruptcy policy, the avoidance is a violation of "the policy protecting [the] rights of secured creditors . .. and [a diminution of] the

integrity of foreclosure sales."70 The value of an item may be different at
different times and for different purposes. 71 The standard of comparing
the price at the foreclosure sale to an appraised market value to determine reasonable equivalent value is unrealistic because of the failure to
take into account the nature of the foreclosure market." Also, since a
bankruptcy trustee may be able to void a foreclosure sale, a purchaser,
other than the secured creditor, is further inhibited from buying at the
foreclosure sale.73 This further depresses foreclosure sale prices and increases deficiencies at foreclosure.7
When the court considers the foreclosure sale price to be a reasonably
equivalent value if the mortgage holder complies with the minimal requirements of state foreclosure law, the courts "allow the interests of secured creditors to trump bankruptcy policy."" s Therefore, courts should
analyze all relevant facts and circumstances and not make "the achievement of a fixed percentage of value or compliance with state foreclosure
law" decisive in the determination of reasonable equivalency/6
The court in Grissom felt that a court must perform a complete inquiry
of all the relevant facts and circumstances in order to find reasonable
equivalency.77 The court in Grissom also agreed with Littleton in that a
simple mathematical test cannot replace the analysis of the important
factors, and that the Durrett seventy percent test is only a guideline."
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Littleton and Grissom, in
those respects, coincide with most circuit courts that have considered the
issue.7
68. Id. at 1446.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1447.

Id.
In re Upham, 48 B.R. 695, 697 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 697.

73. War Eagle Floats, Inc. v. Travis (In re War Eagle Floats, Inc.), 104 B.R. 398, 401

(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1989).
74. Id. at 401 (quoting In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 (6th Cir.
1985)).
75. 955 F.2d at 1447.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1449.
78. Id. at 1445.
79. Id. See Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20, 23-25 (3d
Cir. 1991); Cooper v. Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications NC, Inc.),
914 F.2d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 1990); Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824-25
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VI. CONCLUSION

After Grissom courts should no longer solely apply Durrett's seventy
percent test to determine reasonable equivalency. 0 Now the seventy percent test set forth in Durrett should only be used as a guideline." Courts
should presume that a price brought at a legitimate foreclosure sale that
is free from fraud, collusion, or irregular or unlawful procedures, is a reasonable equivalent to the value of the property."
A foreclosure sale price that is less than seventy percent of the property's value rebuts this presumption of reasonableness. 8 To avoid a foreclosure sale, the bankruptcy trustee must prove factors that undermine
confidence in the foreclosure sale price's reasonableness. 4 For a court to
determine reasonable equivalence, it should thoroughly consider all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the foreclosure sale.8 5 In determining reasonable equivalence, courts should usually consider the following factors: the parties' bargaining position, the property's marketability,
the fact that foreclosure markets usually bring prices lower than those in
other markets, the satisfaction of junior liens, if before the sale the foreclosing party got a fair appraisal of the property, the advertisement of the
foreclosure sale, and the competitive nature of the sale.8 6 Only a totality
of the circumstances test "provide[s] adequate deference to state foreclosure proceedings and the rights of secured creditors, without unduly
trammeling upon the policies of the bankruptcy laws."8"
DEAN C. COPELAN

(7th Cir. 1988); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
80. 955 F.2d at 1449.
81. Id. at 1445.
82. Id. at 1446.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1449.
86. Id. at 1445-46.
87. Id. at 1449.

